Learning through the Grapevine and the Impact of the Breadth and Depth of Social Networks

20 Pages Posted: 7 Dec 2018 Last revised: 19 Jul 2022

See all articles by Matthew O. Jackson

Matthew O. Jackson

Stanford University - Department of Economics; Santa Fe Institute

Suraj Malladi

Cornell University, Department of Economics

David McAdams

Duke University - Fuqua School of Business

Date Written: March 1, 2019

Abstract

We study how communication platforms can improve social learning without censoring or fact-checking messages, when they have members who deliberately and/or inadvertently distort information. Message fidelity depends on social network depth (how many times information can be relayed) and breadth (the number of others with whom a typical user shares information). We characterize how the expected number of true minus false messages depends on breadth and depth of the network and the noise structure. Message fidelity can be improved by capping depth or, if that is not possible, limiting breadth; e.g., by capping the number of people to whom someone can forward a given message. Although caps reduce total communication, they increase the fraction of received messages that have traveled shorter distances and have had less opportunity to be altered, thereby increasing the signal-to-noise ratio.

Keywords: Social Learning, Communication, Noise, Mutation, Bias, Fake News

JEL Classification: D83, D85, L14, O12, Z13

Suggested Citation

Jackson, Matthew O. and Malladi, Suraj and McAdams, David, Learning through the Grapevine and the Impact of the Breadth and Depth of Social Networks (March 1, 2019). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3269543 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3269543

Matthew O. Jackson (Contact Author)

Stanford University - Department of Economics ( email )

Landau Economics Building
579 Serra Mall
Stanford, CA 94305-6072
United States
1-650-723-3544 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.stanford.edu/~jacksonm

Santa Fe Institute

1399 Hyde Park Road
Santa Fe, NM 87501
United States

Suraj Malladi

Cornell University, Department of Economics ( email )

Ithaca, NY
United States

HOME PAGE: http://https://economics.cornell.edu/suraj-malladi

David McAdams

Duke University - Fuqua School of Business ( email )

Box 90120
Durham, NC 27708-0120
United States

Do you have negative results from your research you’d like to share?

Paper statistics

Downloads
225
Abstract Views
4,470
Rank
246,374
PlumX Metrics