Employment Protection Legislation and the Size of Firms

36 Pages Posted: 31 May 2003

See all articles by Pietro Garibaldi

Pietro Garibaldi

Bocconi University - Department of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Lia Pacelli

University of Turin - Department of Economics and Financial Sciences G. Prato; LABORatorio R. Revelli, Centre for Employment Studies

Andrea Borgarello

LABORatorio R. Revelli, Centre for Employment Studies

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: May 2003

Abstract

The existing literature ignores the fact that in most European countries the strictness of Employment Protection Legislation (EPL) varies across the firm size distribution. In Italy firms are obliged to rehire an unfairly dismissed worker only if they employ more than 15 employees. Theoretically, the paper solves a baseline model of EPL with threshold effects, and shows that firms close to the threshold are characterized by an increase in inaction and by a reluctance to grow. Empirically, the paper estimates transition probability matrices on firm level employment using a longitudinal data set based on Italian Social Security (INPS) records, and finds two results. First, firms close to the 15 employees threshold experience an increase in persistence of 1.5 percent with respect to a baseline statistical model. Second, firms with 15 employees are more likely to move backward than upward. Finally, the paper tests the effect of a 1990 reform which tightened the regulation on individual dismissal only for small firms. It finds that the persistence of small firms relative to large firms increased significantly. Overall, these threshold effects are significant and robust, but quantitatively small.

Keywords: Employment Protection Legislation, Firm Size

JEL Classification: J4

Suggested Citation

Garibaldi, Pietro and Pacelli, Lia and Borgarello, Andrea, Employment Protection Legislation and the Size of Firms (May 2003). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=412495 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.412495

Pietro Garibaldi (Contact Author)

Bocconi University - Department of Economics ( email )

Via Gobbi 5
Milan, 20136
Italy
+39 02 5836 5422 (Phone)
+39 02 5836 5343 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.frdb.org/~pietrogaribaldi/

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

Lia Pacelli

University of Turin - Department of Economics and Financial Sciences G. Prato ( email )

C. so Unione Sovietica, 218 Bis
Torino, 13820-4020
Italy
+39 011 670 6038 (Phone)
+39 011 670 6062 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.labor-torino.it/english/people/cv_pacelli.htm

LABORatorio R. Revelli, Centre for Employment Studies

Via Real Collegio 30
10024 Moncalieri
Italy

Andrea Borgarello

LABORatorio R. Revelli, Centre for Employment Studies ( email )

Via Real Collegio 30
10024 Moncalieri
Italy

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