General Courts, Specialized Courts, and the Complementarity Effect

REGULATION & GOVERNANCE, 2023 Forthcoming

Hebrew University of Jerusalem Legal Research Paper No. 22-10

38 Pages Posted: 11 Jun 2022 Last revised: 29 Sep 2022

See all articles by Ehud Guttel

Ehud Guttel

Hebrew University of Jerusalem - Faculty of Law

Alon Harel

Hebrew University of Jerusalem - Faculty of Law

Yuval Procaccia

Interdisciplinary Center (IDC) Herzliyah - Radzyner School of Law

Date Written: June 8, 2022

Abstract

Among the major decisions any legal system must make is deciding whether to establish general courts with broad jurisdiction, or specialized courts with limited jurisdiction. Under one influential argument – advanced by both judges and legal theorists – general courts foster coherence within the legal system. This Article identifies a distinct effect of establishing general courts: “the complementarity effect.” In the case of complementarity, general courts strategically apply different principles in different fields, such that litigants losing in one sphere (e.g., public law) are compensated in another (e.g., private law). We support this conjecture by analyzing three case studies.

Suggested Citation

Guttel, Ehud and Harel, Alon and Procaccia, Yuval, General Courts, Specialized Courts, and the Complementarity Effect (June 8, 2022). REGULATION & GOVERNANCE, 2023 Forthcoming, Hebrew University of Jerusalem Legal Research Paper No. 22-10, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4131732 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4131732

Ehud Guttel (Contact Author)

Hebrew University of Jerusalem - Faculty of Law ( email )

Mount Scopus
Mount Scopus, IL 91905
Israel

Alon Harel

Hebrew University of Jerusalem - Faculty of Law ( email )

Mount Scopus
Mount Scopus, IL 91905
Israel
97 22 588 2582 (Phone)
97 22 582 3042 (Fax)

Yuval Procaccia

Interdisciplinary Center (IDC) Herzliyah - Radzyner School of Law ( email )

P.O. Box 167
Herzliya, 4610101
Israel

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