Anti-Sweatshop Activism and the Safety-Employment Tradeoff: Evidence from Bangladesh's Rana Plaza Disaster

37 Pages Posted: 24 Jun 2022

See all articles by Kevin B. Grier

Kevin B. Grier

Texas Tech University

Towhid Iqram Mahmood

Texas Tech University - Department of Agricultural and Applied Economics

Benjamin Powell

Texas Tech University - Free Market Institute; Texas Tech University - Rawls College of Business

Date Written: June 20, 2022

Abstract

This study investigates the impact of anti-sweatshop activism on garment industry employment and the number of firms in Bangladesh following the 2013 Rana Plaza factory disaster. The disaster led to activism that created two major brand-enforced factory fire and safety agreements. We employ a synthetic control methodology to investigate the tradeoffs associated with multinational firms’ reaction to the disaster and find that that it led to 33.3 percent fewer garment factories in Bangladesh by 2016 and 28.3 percent fewer people employed in Bangladesh’s garment industry by 2017. Given the importance of the garment industry in Bangladesh’s development in providing a pathway out of extreme property, our finding raises important questions about the efficacy of anti-sweatshop activism in improving worker welfare.

Keywords: Sweatshop, Rana Plaza, Bangladesh, Garment Industry, Synthetic Control

JEL Classification: F16, F23, F63, F66, J28, J81

Suggested Citation

Grier, Kevin B. and Mahmood, Towhid Iqram and Powell, Benjamin, Anti-Sweatshop Activism and the Safety-Employment Tradeoff: Evidence from Bangladesh's Rana Plaza Disaster (June 20, 2022). Free Market Institute Research Paper No. 4141435, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4141435 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4141435

Kevin B. Grier (Contact Author)

Texas Tech University ( email )

2500 Broadway
Lubbock, TX 79409
United States

Towhid Iqram Mahmood

Texas Tech University - Department of Agricultural and Applied Economics ( email )

Suite 167, 2625 Memorial Circle
TTU Administration
Lubbock, TX 79409
United States

Benjamin Powell

Texas Tech University - Free Market Institute ( email )

Box 45059
Lubbock, TX 79409-5059
United States
806.742.7138 (Phone)
806.742.1854 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.fmi.ttu.edu

Texas Tech University - Rawls College of Business ( email )

Lubbock, TX 79409
United States
806.834.3097 (Phone)
806.742.1854 (Fax)

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