Pursuing Competition in Local Telephony: The Law and Economics of Unbundling and Impairment

Telepolicy Working Paper

29 Pages Posted: 22 Aug 2003

See all articles by Thomas Randolph Beard

Thomas Randolph Beard

Auburn University - Department of Economics

Robert B. Ekelund

Auburn University - Department of Economics

George S. Ford

Phoenix Center for Advanced Legal & Economic Public Policy Studies

Abstract

This paper surveys the impairment standard of Section 251(d)(2)(B) of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 and its content as it has been interpreted by both the FCC and the Courts. The Congressional standard relating to unbundling clearly pointed to its impact on each CLEC's output, and relevant Court decisions have repeatedly upheld this view. We develop a formal theoretical model of impairment that relates element Availability to CLEC output. This theoretical model is then subjected to empirical tests.

Keywords: 1996 Telecommunications Act, unbundling, FCC, Federal Communications Commission, telecommunications, communications, regulation, impairment, policy, UNE-P, UNE Platform, UNE-L, UNE-Loop, UNE Loop, UNE-Platform, Ford, Ekelund, Beard, competition, entry

JEL Classification: K2, L1, L5, L9

Suggested Citation

Beard, Thomas Randolph and Ekelund, Robert B. and Ford, George S., Pursuing Competition in Local Telephony: The Law and Economics of Unbundling and Impairment. Telepolicy Working Paper, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=422525 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.422525

Thomas Randolph Beard

Auburn University - Department of Economics ( email )

415 W. Magnolia
Auburn, AL 36849-5242
United States

Robert B. Ekelund

Auburn University - Department of Economics ( email )

415 W. Magnolia
Auburn, AL 36849-5242
United States
334-844-2929 (Phone)

George S. Ford (Contact Author)

Phoenix Center for Advanced Legal & Economic Public Policy Studies ( email )

5335 Wisconsin Avenue, NW
Suite 440
Washington, DC 20015
United States

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