Indirect Costs of Financial Distress

79 Pages Posted: 8 Jan 2019 Last revised: 25 Oct 2022

See all articles by Claudia Custodio

Claudia Custodio

Imperial College London; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Miguel A. Ferreira

Nova School of Business and Economics; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Emilia Garcia-Appendini

Norges Bank; University of Zurich - Department Finance

Multiple version iconThere are 3 versions of this paper

Date Written: October 13, 2022

Abstract

We estimate the indirect costs of financial distress due to lost sales by exploiting real estate
shocks and cross-supplier variation in real estate assets and leverage. We show that for the
same client buying from different suppliers, the client’s purchases from distressed
suppliers decline by an additional 13% following a drop in local real estate prices. The
effect is more pronounced in more competitive industries, manufacturing, durable goods,
less-specific goods, and when the costs of switching suppliers are low. Our results suggest
that clients reduce their exposure to suppliers in financial distress.

Keywords: Financial Distress, Economic Distress, Real Estate Shocks, Supply Chain

JEL Classification: G31, G32, G33, L11, L14

Suggested Citation

Custodio, Claudia and Ferreira, Miguel Almeida and Garcia-Appendini, Emilia, Indirect Costs of Financial Distress (October 13, 2022). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3310941 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3310941

Claudia Custodio

Imperial College London ( email )

South Kensington Campus
Exhibition Road
London, Greater London SW7 2AZ
United Kingdom

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

London
United Kingdom

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

Miguel Almeida Ferreira (Contact Author)

Nova School of Business and Economics ( email )

Campus de Carcavelos
Rua da Holanda, 1
Carcavelos, 2775-405
Portugal

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

London
United Kingdom

Emilia Garcia-Appendini

Norges Bank ( email )

P.O. Box 1179
Oslo, N-0107
Norway

University of Zurich - Department Finance ( email )

Schönberggasse 1
Zürich, 8001
Switzerland

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