Parliamentary Oversight of WTO Rule-Making: The Political and Normative Context

Journal of International Economic Law, Vol. 7, No. 3, pp. 629-54, 2004

27 Pages Posted: 29 Aug 2003 Last revised: 25 Aug 2010

See all articles by Gregory Shaffer

Gregory Shaffer

Georgetown University Law Center

Date Written: August 1, 2003

Abstract

This article makes four primary points regarding the issue of parliamentary oversight of WTO rule-making. First, we need a conceptual framework to assess the tradeoffs between different mechanisms for ensuring oversight, including parliamentary oversight, of the WTO. No institutional mechanism is perfect. All proposed mechanisms should be assessed in terms of how well they permit parties to participate in decision-making that affects them in a relatively unbiased manner compared to other realistic, non-idealized institutional alternatives. This analytical framework can be termed "comparative institutional analysis."

Suggested Citation

Shaffer, Gregory, Parliamentary Oversight of WTO Rule-Making: The Political and Normative Context (August 1, 2003). Journal of International Economic Law, Vol. 7, No. 3, pp. 629-54, 2004, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=434420 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.434420

Gregory Shaffer (Contact Author)

Georgetown University Law Center ( email )

600 New Jersey Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20001
United States

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