Does Speculative News Hurt Productivity? Evidence from Takeover Rumors

67 Pages Posted: 19 Jan 2021 Last revised: 16 Feb 2023

See all articles by Christian Andres

Christian Andres

WHU - Otto Beisheim School of Management

Dmitry Bazhutov

BUW - Schumpeter School of Business and Economics

Douglas J. Cumming

Florida Atlantic University; Birmingham Business School; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Peter Limbach

University of Bielefeld; Centre for Financial Research (CFR)

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: January 19, 2023

Abstract

Speculative news on corporate takeovers may hurt productivity because uncertainty and threat of job loss cause anxiety, distraction, and reduced collaboration and morale among employees and managers. Using a panel of OECD-headquartered firms, we show that firm productivity temporarily declines upon announcements of speculative takeover rumors that do not materialize. This productivity dip is more pronounced for targets and for firms in countries with weaker employee rights and less long-term orientation. Abnormal stock returns mirror these results. The evidence fosters our understanding of potential real effects of speculative financial news and the costs of takeover threats.

Keywords: Distraction, Employee commitment, Employee rights, Fear of job loss, Productivity, Shareholder wealth, Takeover speculation

JEL Classification: D24, G00, G34, J24

Suggested Citation

Andres, Christian and Bazhutov, Dmitry and Cumming, Douglas J. and Limbach, Peter, Does Speculative News Hurt Productivity? Evidence from Takeover Rumors (January 19, 2023). European Corporate Governance Institute – Finance Working Paper No. 884/2023, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3739509 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3739509

Christian Andres (Contact Author)

WHU - Otto Beisheim School of Management ( email )

Burgplatz 2
Vallendar, 56179
Germany

Dmitry Bazhutov

BUW - Schumpeter School of Business and Economics ( email )

Gaußstraße 20
42097 Wuppertal
Germany

Douglas J. Cumming

Florida Atlantic University ( email )

777 Glades Rd
Boca Raton, FL 33431
United States

HOME PAGE: http://sites.google.com/view/douglascumming/bio?authuser=0

Birmingham Business School ( email )

Edgbaston Park Road
Birmingham, B15 2TY
United Kingdom

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

HOME PAGE: http://https://ecgi.global/users/douglas-cumming

Peter Limbach

University of Bielefeld ( email )

Centre for Financial Research (CFR) ( email )

Albertus-Magnus-Platz
Köln, 50923
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.finance.uni-koeln.de

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