It's Not Easy Being Green

47 Pages Posted: 20 Dec 2022 Last revised: 13 Apr 2023

See all articles by Jonathan Brogaard

Jonathan Brogaard

University of Utah - David Eccles School of Business

Nataliya Gerasimova

BI Norwegian Business School

Daniel Kim

University of Waterloo

Maximilian Rohrer

NHH - Norwegian School of Economics

Date Written: December 9, 2022

Abstract

Being green is not easy, but is it also costly? We use US government procurement contracts to calculate the cost of being green. Comparing contracts that are nearly identical but for one being required by regulation to be green we find a cost premium of at least 20%. We further show that the quality of green contracts, for otherwise identical products and services, are worse along a variety of dimensions, even though there is no measurable difference in their competitiveness. The green premium does not increase employment but seems to be a wealth transfer to private firms. The green contracts do spur green innovation, but at a cost 50 times per patent versus a direct R&D investment. This paper calls into question the demand that the government leads the green revolution.

Keywords: Green; procurement; innovation

JEL Classification: G38; H57; P16; Q58

Suggested Citation

Brogaard, Jonathan and Gerasimova, Nataliya and Kim, Daniel and Rohrer, Maximilian, It's Not Easy Being Green (December 9, 2022). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4298702 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4298702

Jonathan Brogaard

University of Utah - David Eccles School of Business ( email )

1645 E Campus Center Dr
Salt Lake City, UT 84112-9303
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.jonathanbrogaard.com

Nataliya Gerasimova

BI Norwegian Business School ( email )

Nydalsveien 37
Oslo, 0442
Norway

Daniel Kim (Contact Author)

University of Waterloo ( email )

Waterloo, Ontario N2L 3G1
Canada

Maximilian Rohrer

NHH - Norwegian School of Economics ( email )

Helleveien 30
N-5045 Bergen
Norway

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