A Theoretical Analysis of Alcohol Regulation and Drinking-Related Economic Crime

33 Pages Posted: 13 Oct 2003

See all articles by Paul R. Zimmerman

Paul R. Zimmerman

U.S. Federal Trade Commission - Bureau of Economics

Date Written: 2003

Abstract

Alcohol consumption is widely believed to influence criminal activity, and numerous sociological, criminological, and psychological studies demonstrate an apparent positive correlation between drinking and crime. Using a multiattribute model of offender and victim behavior, this study examines the theoretical effects of changes in the price of alcohol on the incidence of crimes committed for economic gain. It is shown that in the general case price effects do not result in an unambiguous decrease in the rates of crime or victimization even when the models are constructed to impose a bias towards the finding of a causal negative price effect. Using a modified model of the drinking offender that imposes even further structure on the model, it is shown that the realization and magnitude of a negative equilibrium alcohol price effect will likely depend upon the implementation of complementary alcohol control policies. The implications of the theoretical analysis to policy implementation and empirical research are also considered.

Keywords: drinking, crime, alcohol regulation

JEL Classification: K42, I18, J22

Suggested Citation

Zimmerman, Paul R., A Theoretical Analysis of Alcohol Regulation and Drinking-Related Economic Crime (2003). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=444622 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.444622

Paul R. Zimmerman (Contact Author)

U.S. Federal Trade Commission - Bureau of Economics ( email )

601 New Jersey Ave. NW
Rm. 8103
Washington, DC 20580
United States

HOME PAGE: http://paul.r.zimmerman.googlepages.com/

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