Political Power and Market Power
CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP17178
83 Pages Posted: 16 Mar 2023 Last revised: 10 Nov 2023
There are 2 versions of this paper
Political Power and Market Power
Political Power and Market Power
Date Written: June 1, 2021
Abstract
Brandeis (1914) hypothesized that firms with market power will also attempt to gain political power. To explore this hypothesis empirically, we combine data on mergers with data on lobbying expenditures and campaign contributions in the US from 1999 to 2017. We pursue two distinct empirical approaches: a panel event study and a differential exposure design. Both approaches indicate that mergers are followed by large and robust increases in lobbying activity, both by individual firms and by industry trade associations. There is also some evidence for an association of mergers with campaign contributions. Mergers are also related to extensive margin changes in political activity, such as the first establishment of in-house lobbying teams and corporate PACs (in either company's history). We interpret these results within an oligopoly model augmented with endogenous regulation and lobbying.
Keywords: Political influence, lobbying, mergers, industrial concentration.
JEL Classification: D72, L51, G34, L10
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation