Competition of Politicians for Wages and Office
University of Heidelberg Economics Discusssion Paper No. 399
24 Pages Posted: 31 Jan 2004
There are 2 versions of this paper
Competition of Politicians for Wages and Office
Competition of Politicians for Wages and Office
Date Written: November 2003
Abstract
We examine a model in which two politicians compete for office and for wages. Their remunerations are either set by the public or are offered competitively by the candidates during campaigns. Our main finding shows that competitive wage offers by candidates lead to lower social welfare than remunerations predetermined by the public, since less competent candidates are elected or wage costs are higher.
Keywords: Competitive wage offers, remunerations of politicians, elections, free riding and underprovision, incentive contracts
JEL Classification: D70, D80
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Do you have negative results from your research you’d like to share?
Recommended Papers
-
Competition of Politicians for Incentive Contracts and Elections
-
Re-Election Threshold Contracts in Politics
By Hans Gersbach and Verena Liessem
-
Reelection Threshold Contracts in Politics
By Hans Gersbach and Verena Liessem
-
Incentive Contracts and Elections for Politicians with Multi-Task Problems
By Verena Liessem and Hans Gersbach
-
Incentive Contracts and Elections for Politicians with Multi-Task Problems
By Hans Gersbach and Verena Liessem
-
By Volker Hahn
-
Elections, Contracts and Markets
By Hans Gersbach and Markus Muller
-
Elections, Contracts and Markets
By Hans Gersbach and Markus Müller