The People's Romance: Why People Love Government (as Much as They Do)

46 Pages Posted: 17 Feb 2004

See all articles by Daniel B. Klein

Daniel B. Klein

George Mason University - Department of Economics; George Mason University - Mercatus Center

Date Written: February 10, 2004

Abstract

Using Schelling's analysis of mutual coordination and focal points, I interpret Smithian sympathy as sentiment coordination. When the yearning for sentiment coordination seeks, further, for it to encompass the whole social group and looks naturally to government for the focal points, we have The People's Romance. This yearning for encompassing sentiment coordination asserts itself by denying individual self-ownership. Government activism and coercion become romantic ends in themselves. The People's Romance is evident in the writings of communists, social democrats, and others who champion the achieving of a "common understanding," "common endeavor," or "shared experience." The People's Romance helps to explain a wide variety of political and cultural puzzles. By and large, this collectivist yearning is deeply misguided, mainly because people neglect or underestimate its costs and damages. I explore whether The People's Romance can be compatible with libertarian goals and values, and conclude in the negative.

Keywords: Sentiments, coordination, collectivism, statism, coercion, liberty

JEL Classification: Z00

Suggested Citation

Klein, Daniel B., The People's Romance: Why People Love Government (as Much as They Do) (February 10, 2004). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=502623 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.502623

Daniel B. Klein (Contact Author)

George Mason University - Department of Economics ( email )

4400 University Drive
Fairfax, VA 22030
United States

HOME PAGE: http://economics.gmu.edu/people/dklein

George Mason University - Mercatus Center ( email )

3434 Washington Blvd., 4th Floor
Arlington, VA 22201
United States

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