A Comparison of Auditor and Client Negotiation Decisions

28 Pages Posted: 29 Apr 2004

See all articles by Charles Bame-Aldred

Charles Bame-Aldred

Washington State University; Northeastern University - Accounting Group

Thomas Kida

University of Massachusetts at Amherst

Date Written: April 2004

Abstract

This study examines the negotiation decisions made by professional auditors and clients when facing a revenue recognition conflict. Specifically, we investigate the degree of flexibility inherent in auditor and client negotiation decisions, whether auditors and clients accurately perceive the other negotiating party's positions, and the types of negotiation tactics used by both parties. The results indicate that auditors and clients approach conflict resolution in very different ways. Clients were more flexible (i.e., exhibited a greater difference between their revenue recognition goals and limits), determined the auditor's goals and limits more accurately, and were more likely to use negotiation tactics such as bid high/concede later and trade-off one reporting issue for another. These data are consistent with the view that auditors are hired to provide independent, accurate judgments on financial reporting matters, and may therefore consider their accounting decisions to be less open for negotiation as compared to clients. Implications and directions for future research are discussed.

Keywords: Auditing, Negotiation

JEL Classification: M40, M49

Suggested Citation

Bame-Aldred, Charles and Bame-Aldred, Charles and Kida, Thomas, A Comparison of Auditor and Client Negotiation Decisions (April 2004). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=536903 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.536903

Charles Bame-Aldred (Contact Author)

Washington State University ( email )

College of Business & Economics
Pullman, WA 99164-4729
United States
509-335-2421 (Phone)
509-335-4075 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: www.cbe.wsu.edu/~cbamealdred

Northeastern University - Accounting Group ( email )

360 Huntington Ave.
Boston, MA 02115
United States

Thomas Kida

University of Massachusetts at Amherst ( email )

Isenberg School of Management
Amherst, MA 01003
United States
413-545-5650 (Phone)
413-545-3858 (Fax)

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