Non-Uniform Bids in Bidding Rings

6 Pages Posted: 16 Aug 2004

See all articles by Ki-Eun Rhee

Ki-Eun Rhee

KDI School of Public Policy and Management

Date Written: July 2004

Abstract

This paper shows that the bid rotation scheme in McAfee and McMillan (1992) is no longer optimal when negative externalities are involved among the bidders. The optimal collusive bidding scheme in such case involves partial sorting.

Keywords: Auctions

JEL Classification: D44

Suggested Citation

Rhee, Ki-Eun, Non-Uniform Bids in Bidding Rings (July 2004). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=576782 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.576782

Ki-Eun Rhee (Contact Author)

KDI School of Public Policy and Management ( email )

P.O. Box 184
Seoul, 130-868
Korea, Republic of (South Korea)

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