Two Models of Equality and Responsibility

53 Pages Posted: 10 Sep 2004

See all articles by Michael Blake

Michael Blake

University of Washington - Department of Philosophy & Daniel J. Evans School of Public Affairs

Mathias Risse

Harvard University - Harvard Kennedy School (HKS)

Date Written: August 2004

Abstract

Much current thinking about justice concerns the place of responsibility within an overall account of justice. Theorists of justice such as John Rawls have been criticized for their inability to make their conclusions accord with our intuitions about responsibility. This paper argues that such criticisms are mistaken. To establish this argument, the paper introduces a distinction between indirect and direct accounts of distributive justice. Direct theories are characterized by a moralized account of the good to be distributed; indirect theories, in contrast, employ an account of the good that is morally relevant only in specific context, and then only subject to further argumentation. This distinction is employed to counter criticisms of Rawls given by John Roemer and Richard Arneson.

Suggested Citation

Blake, Michael and Risse, Mathias, Two Models of Equality and Responsibility (August 2004). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=588950 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.588950

Michael Blake (Contact Author)

University of Washington - Department of Philosophy & Daniel J. Evans School of Public Affairs ( email )

Savery 331F, Box 353350
Seattle, WA 98195
United States
206-221-7859 (Phone)
206-685-8740 (Fax)

Mathias Risse

Harvard University - Harvard Kennedy School (HKS) ( email )

79 John F. Kennedy Street
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
617-495-9811 (Phone)
617-495-4297 (Fax)

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