The Desire for Impact

Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper No. TI 2004-115/1

CESifo Working Paper Series No. 1535

27 Pages Posted: 1 Nov 2004

See all articles by Robert Dur

Robert Dur

Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR) - Department of Economics; Tinbergen Institute; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute); IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Amihai Glazer

University of California, Irvine - Department of Economics

Date Written: September 2005

Abstract

This paper explores the meaning and implications of the desire by workers for impact. We find that this impact motive can make firms in a competitive labor market act as monopsonists, lead workers with the same characteristics but at different firms to earn different wages, may alleviate the hold-up problem in firm-specific investment, can make it profitable for an employer to give workers autonomy in effort or task choice, and can propagate shocks to unemployment.

Keywords: Impact, monopsonistic behavior, wage differentials, hold-up problem, contracts, autonomy

JEL Classification: J3, J4, M5

Suggested Citation

Dur, Robert and Glazer, Amihai, The Desire for Impact (September 2005). Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper No. TI 2004-115/1, CESifo Working Paper Series No. 1535, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=610962 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.610962

Robert Dur (Contact Author)

Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR) - Department of Economics ( email )

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Tinbergen Institute

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CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

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IZA Institute of Labor Economics

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Amihai Glazer

University of California, Irvine - Department of Economics ( email )

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United States
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