The Pro-Collusive Effect of Increased Cartel Detection Probabilities

Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper No. TI 2004-117/1

8 Pages Posted: 15 Nov 2004

See all articles by Jeroen Hinloopen

Jeroen Hinloopen

CPB Netherlands Bureau of Economic Policy Analysis; University of Amsterdam - Amsterdam School of Economics (ASE); Tinbergen Institute

Date Written: November 2004

Abstract

An increase in cartel discovery probability due to irregular price movements that result from cartel defection is shown to increase cartel stability as short-run defection profits are less likely to be earned.

Keywords: Cartel stability, detection probabilities, defection incentives

JEL Classification: L12, L41

Suggested Citation

Hinloopen, Jeroen, The Pro-Collusive Effect of Increased Cartel Detection Probabilities (November 2004). Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper No. TI 2004-117/1, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=617247 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.617247

Jeroen Hinloopen (Contact Author)

CPB Netherlands Bureau of Economic Policy Analysis ( email )

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University of Amsterdam - Amsterdam School of Economics (ASE) ( email )

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