The Pro-Collusive Effect of Increased Cartel Detection Probabilities
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper No. TI 2004-117/1
8 Pages Posted: 15 Nov 2004
Date Written: November 2004
Abstract
An increase in cartel discovery probability due to irregular price movements that result from cartel defection is shown to increase cartel stability as short-run defection profits are less likely to be earned.
Keywords: Cartel stability, detection probabilities, defection incentives
JEL Classification: L12, L41
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
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