Corporate Governance and Development

56 Pages Posted: 5 Jan 2005

See all articles by Stijn Claessens

Stijn Claessens

Bank for International Settlements (BIS)

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Date Written: October 2003

Abstract

This paper investigates the relationship between corporate governance and economic development and well-being. It finds that better corporate frameworks benefit firms through greater access to financing, lower cost of capital, better firm performance, and more favorable treatment of all stakeholders. Numerous studies agree that these channels operate not only at the level of the firms, but in sectors and countries as well - although causality is not always clear. There is also evidence that when a country's overall corporate governance and property rights system are weak, voluntary and market corporate governance mechanisms have limited effectiveness. Less evidence is available on the direct links between corporate governance and poverty. There are also some specific corporate governance issues in various regions and countries that have not yet been analyzed in detail. In particular, the special corporate governance issues of banks, family-owned firms, and state-owned firms are not well understood, nor are the nature and of determinants of enforcement. Importantly, the dynamic aspects of corporate governance - that is, how corporate governance regimes change over time - have only recently received attention. This paper concludes by identifying some main policy and research issues that require further study.

Keywords: Corporate governance, development, finance

JEL Classification: G34, G32, G38, G33

Suggested Citation

Claessens, Stijn, Corporate Governance and Development (October 2003). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=642721 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.642721

Stijn Claessens (Contact Author)

Bank for International Settlements (BIS) ( email )

Centralbahnplatz 2
CH-4002 Basel
Switzerland

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