A Variance Screen for Collusion
27 Pages Posted: 7 Apr 2005
Date Written: March 2005
Abstract
In this paper, we examine price movements over time around the collapse of a bid-rigging conspiracy. While the mean decreased by sixteen percent, the standard deviation increased by over two hundred percent. We hypothesize that conspiracies in other industries would exhibit similar characteristics and search for "pockets" of low price variation as indicators of collusion in the retail gasoline industry in Louisville. We observe no such areas around Louisville in 1996-2002.
Keywords: Collusion, Price Fixing, Firms, Firm
JEL Classification: L12, L41, D40
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
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