B2b Marketplaces: Emergence and Entry

CORE Discussion Paper No. 2004/78

38 Pages Posted: 15 Apr 2005

See all articles by Paul Belleflamme

Paul Belleflamme

CORE/LIDAM, UCLouvain (Université Catholique de Louvain); CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Eric Toulemonde

IZA Institute of Labor Economics; Facultés Universitaires Notre-Dame de la Paix (FUNDP) - Faculty of Economics, Management and Social Sciences

Date Written: November 2004

Abstract

In a successive vertical oligopoly, a set of sellers produce some input to be transformed into a final product by a set of buyers. On this two-sided market, a firm's profit increases with the number of firms of the other type and decreases with the number of firms of its own type. We examine the emergence or the entry of a new marketplace sponsored by a profit-maximizing intermediary who targets buyers and sellers in sequential way by setting membership fees (or subsidies).

Keywords: two-sided markets, vertical oligopoly, B2B

JEL Classification: L11, L13, L23

Suggested Citation

Belleflamme, Paul and Toulemonde, Eric, B2b Marketplaces: Emergence and Entry (November 2004). CORE Discussion Paper No. 2004/78, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=688881 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.688881

Paul Belleflamme (Contact Author)

CORE/LIDAM, UCLouvain (Université Catholique de Louvain) ( email )

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CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

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Eric Toulemonde

IZA Institute of Labor Economics ( email )

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Belgium
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