Subgroup and Superordinate Caucusing in Intergroup Negotiations

Abstract

Two interactive studies on multiparty negotiations - with parties represented by several negotiators - show that different interaction structures (or caucusing structures) influence the formation of shared social identities, thereby influencing negotiation behavior and outcomes (Study 1, N = 108, Study 2, N = 238). Subgroup caucusing led to higher subgroup identification, the development of more shared cognition and better material outcomes. Superordinate group caucusing led to superordinate group identification, stimulating fair behavior, and promoting social outcomes that were equitable and satisfactory. A combination of both subgroup and superordinate communication led to a form of group solidarity that contained elements of subgroup differentiation within the superordinate commonality of a negotiating group. This type of caucusing structure was also most closely associated with interactions that were both procedurally and distributively fair.

Keywords: Shared Cognition, Fairness, Negotiation Outcomes