The Pro-Collusive Effect of Increasing the Repose Period for Price Fixing Agreements

Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper No. 2005-104/1

13 Pages Posted: 28 Nov 2005

See all articles by Jeroen Hinloopen

Jeroen Hinloopen

CPB Netherlands Bureau of Economic Policy Analysis; University of Amsterdam - Amsterdam School of Economics (ASE); Tinbergen Institute

Date Written: November 2005

Abstract

Intuitively, extending the period of repose for price fixing agreements enhances the effectiveness of competition policy enforcement. This paper proofs this intuition wrong. As extending the repose period reduces cartel members' defection payoff while it leaves unaltered expected compliance profits, it induces cartels to be more stable internally.

Keywords: cartel stability, detection probabilities, statue of limitation

JEL Classification: K21, K42, L12, L41

Suggested Citation

Hinloopen, Jeroen, The Pro-Collusive Effect of Increasing the Repose Period for Price Fixing Agreements (November 2005). Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper No. 2005-104/1, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=855966 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.855966

Jeroen Hinloopen (Contact Author)

CPB Netherlands Bureau of Economic Policy Analysis ( email )

P.O. Box 80510
2508 GM The Hague, 2585 JR
Netherlands

University of Amsterdam - Amsterdam School of Economics (ASE) ( email )

Roetersstraat 11
Amsterdam, North Holland 1018 WB
Netherlands

Tinbergen Institute ( email )

Burg. Oudlaan 50
Rotterdam, 3062 PA
Netherlands

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