Addiction and the Theory of Action

Abstract

Some scientific research in rational choice theory and behavioral economics - call it choice-theoretic research - seems to point to the conclusion that addicts are fully responsible for what they do. I argue in this paper, however, that the choice-theoretic approach to human behavior presupposes a theory of action that is inconsistent with the assumptions about moral responsibility that are imbedded in the notion of criminal liability. While the economic view of behavior may be perfectly adequate to certain other policy concerns of the law, a theory of action adequate to the understanding of criminal responsibility must take into account factors that are not countenanced in the economic view. I examine three different philosophical approaches that are consistent with the economic view, and show that they are inadequate to distinctions made in the criminal law. I then argue what is missing is a factor that is once more being taken seriously in the philosophy of action, the notion of will. Whether the required sense of will can be made consistent with a naturalistic view of human beings is a separate question.