The Effect of Bank Supervision on Loan Growth
FDIC Center for Financial Resarch Working Paper No. 2006-12
44 Pages Posted: 5 Nov 2006
Date Written: September 2006
Abstract
This paper quantifies the short-term and long-term impact of bank supervision (measured using CAMEL composite and component ratings) on different categories of loan growth: (a) commercial and industrial loans, b) consumer loans, and (c) real estate loans. For each of these categories, we perform dynamic loan growth equations at the state level augmented by the inclusion of CAMEL ratings for all banks in the state, after controlling for banking and economic conditions. We perform these regressions for two distinct subperiods: (1) 1985 through 1993 (which covers the credit crunch period), and (2) 1994 through 2004 (which covers the sustained recovery period). For the first period, 1985 to 1993, we find that out of the three loan categories considered, business lending is the most sensitive to changes in CAMEL ratings (both the composite and the components), although the other loan categories also show some sensitivity. Overall, however, we find little evidence suggesting that the effects of changes in any of the components of CAMEL ratings differ systematically from the effects of changes in the composite CAMEL. For the second period, we find little evidence that changes in CAMEL ratings (the composite or its components) had any systematic effect on loan growth for any of the loan categories considered.
Keywords: Loan growth equations, CAMEL downgrades, banking sector conditions
JEL Classification: E44, G21
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
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