Public Action for Public Goods

40 Pages Posted: 7 Feb 2007

See all articles by Abhijit V. Banerjee

Abhijit V. Banerjee

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Department of Economics

Lakshmi Iyer

Harvard Business School - Business, Government and the International Economy Unit

Rohini Somanathan

University of Delhi - Department of Economics

Multiple version iconThere are 3 versions of this paper

Date Written: September 30, 2006

Abstract

This paper focuses on the relationship between public action and access to public goods. It begins by developing a simple model of collective action which is intended to capture the various mechanisms that are discussed in the theoretical literature on collective action. We argue that several of these intuitive theoretical arguments rely on special additional assumptions that are often not made clear. We then review the empirical work based on the predictions of these models of collective action. While the available evidence is generally consistent with these theories, there is a dearth of quality evidence. Moreover, a large part of the variation in access to public goods seems to have nothing to do with the "bottom-up" forces highlighted in these models and instead reflect more "top-down" interventions. We conclude with a discussion of some of the historical evidence on top-down interventions.

Keywords: Public goods, collective action

JEL Classification: H41, 012

Suggested Citation

Banerjee, Abhijit V. and Iyer, Lakshmi and Somanathan, Rohini, Public Action for Public Goods (September 30, 2006). MIT Department of Economics Working Paper No. 07-05, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=961497 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.961497

Abhijit V. Banerjee (Contact Author)

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Department of Economics ( email )

50 Memorial Drive
Room E52-252D
Cambridge, MA 02142
United States
617-253-8855 (Phone)
617-253-6915 (Fax)

Lakshmi Iyer

Harvard Business School - Business, Government and the International Economy Unit ( email )

Cambridge, MA
United States

Rohini Somanathan

University of Delhi - Department of Economics ( email )

Delhi-110007
India

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