Corporate Investment and Dividend Decisions Under Differential Personal Taxation

22 Pages Posted: 12 Feb 2007

See all articles by Brett Trueman

Brett Trueman

University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) - Anderson School of Management

Ronald W. Masulis

University of New South Wales, Sydney; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI); Financial Research Network (FIRN); National University of Singapore (NUS) - Asian Bureau of Finance and Economic Research (ABFER)

Abstract

This paper explores implications of differential personal taxation for corporate investment and dividend decisions. The personal tax advantage of dividend deferral causes shareholders to generally prefer greater investment in real assets under internal as opposed to external financing. Furthermore, dividend deferral is shown to be costly at the corporate level, causing shareholders in different tax brackets at times to disagree over optimal investment and dividend policies under internal financing. The profitability of internally-financed security investment is shown to depend on a security's tax status and shareholders' tax brackets. However, externally-financed security purchases are unprofitable from a tax standpoint.

Keywords: Dividends, Investment, Personal Taxation, Corporate Taxation, Internal Financing, External Financing, Tax Brackets, Taxes, Shareholder Conflicts of Interest

JEL Classification: D23, G31, G35, H23, H24, H25

Suggested Citation

Trueman, Brett and Masulis, Ronald W., Corporate Investment and Dividend Decisions Under Differential Personal Taxation. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 23, No. 4, 1998, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=962143

Brett Trueman

University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) - Anderson School of Management ( email )

110 Westwood Plaza
Los Angeles, CA 90095-1481
United States
310-825-4720 (Phone)
310-267-2193 (Fax)

Ronald W. Masulis (Contact Author)

University of New South Wales, Sydney ( email )

UNSW Business School
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Sydney, NSW 2052
Australia
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612-9385-6347 (Fax)

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

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Belgium

Financial Research Network (FIRN)

C/- University of Queensland Business School
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Queensland
Australia

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National University of Singapore (NUS) - Asian Bureau of Finance and Economic Research (ABFER) ( email )

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1 Business Link
Singapore, 117592
Singapore

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