Corporate Governance Reforms in Continental Europe

Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 21, No. 1, pp. 117-140, Winter 2007

24 Pages Posted: 16 Mar 2007

See all articles by Luca Enriques

Luca Enriques

University of Oxford Faculty of Law; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Paolo F. Volpin

Drexel University - Bennett S. LeBow College of Business; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI); City University London - Faculty of Finance

Abstract

This essay first describes the differences in the ownership structure of companies in the three main economies of continental Europe - Germany, France, and Italy - with comparisons to the United States and the United Kingdom. Next, it summarizes the corporate governance issues that arise in firms with a dominant shareholder. Then, it provides a brief account of the major European corporate scandal, Parmalat, as an extreme example of investor expropriation in a family-controlled corporation. After outlining in general the legal tools that can be used to tackle abuses by controlling shareholders (internal governance mechanisms, shareholder empowerment, disclosure, public enforcement), it describes the corporate governance reforms enacted by France, Germany, and Italy between 1991 and 2005 and assesses the way in which investor protection in the three countries has changed.

Keywords: Corporate Governance, Concentrated Ownership, Corporate Law Reform, Internal Governance, Shareholder Empowerment, Disclosure, Private Enforcement, Public Enforcement

JEL Classification: G18, G32, G34, G38

Suggested Citation

Enriques, Luca and Volpin, Paolo F., Corporate Governance Reforms in Continental Europe. Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 21, No. 1, pp. 117-140, Winter 2007, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=970796

Luca Enriques (Contact Author)

University of Oxford Faculty of Law ( email )

St Cross Building
St Cross Road
Oxford, OX1 3UL
United Kingdom

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

HOME PAGE: http://http:/www.ecgi.org

Paolo F. Volpin

Drexel University - Bennett S. LeBow College of Business ( email )

101 N. 33rd St.
Philadelphia, PA 19104
United States

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium

HOME PAGE: http:/www.ecgi.org

City University London - Faculty of Finance ( email )

London, EC2Y 8HB
Great Britain

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