Legislative Process With Open Rules
CER-ETH Working Paper No. 07/64
35 Pages Posted: 9 Apr 2007
There are 2 versions of this paper
Legislative Process With Open Rules
Legislative Process with Open Rules
Date Written: February 2007
Abstract
We examine the legislative game with open rules proposed by Baron and Ferejohn (1989). We first show that the three-group equilibrium suggested by Baron and Ferejohn does not always obtain. Second, we characterize the set of stationary equilibria for simple and super majority rules. Such equilibria are either of the three-group or four-group type. The latter type tends to occur when the size of the legislature becomes larger. Moreover, four-group equilibria imply large delay costs.
Keywords: Baron/Ferejohn model, bargaining in legislatures, open rules, three-group
JEL Classification: D7
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
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