Do Parties Matter for Economic Outcomes? A Regression-Discontinuity Approach

27 Pages Posted: 25 May 2007

See all articles by Per Pettersson-Lidbom

Per Pettersson-Lidbom

Stockholm University - Department of Economics; Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN)

Date Written: February 3, 2006

Abstract

A long-standing issue in political economics is whether party control makes a difference in determining fiscal and economics policies. This question is very difficult to answer empirically since parties are not randomly selected to govern political entities. This paper uses a regression-discontinuity design, i.e., party control changes discontinuously at 50 percent of the vote share, which can produce near experimental causal estimates of the effect of party control on economic outcomes. The method is applied to a large panel data set from Swedish local governments with a number of attractive features. The results show that there is an economically significant party effect: left-wing governments spend and tax 2-3 percent more than right-wing governments. Left-wing governments also have 7 percent lower unemployment rates, which is partly due to that left-wing governments employ 4 percent more workers than right-wing governments.

Keywords: regression discontinuity, party control, political parties, partisan politics, fiscal policy, unemployment, natural experiment

JEL Classification: D72, D78, E62, H72

Suggested Citation

Pettersson-Lidbom, Per, Do Parties Matter for Economic Outcomes? A Regression-Discontinuity Approach (February 3, 2006). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=988343 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.988343

Per Pettersson-Lidbom (Contact Author)

Stockholm University - Department of Economics ( email )

Universitetsvägen 10 A
House A, floor 4 and 7
Frescati, Stockholm
Sweden

Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN) ( email )

Box 55665
Grevgatan 34, 2nd floor
Stockholm, SE-102 15
Sweden

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