Female Career Success: Institutions, Path Dependence and Psychology

29 Pages Posted: 27 Jun 2007

See all articles by Magnus Henrekson

Magnus Henrekson

Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN)

Anna Dreber

Stockholm School of Economics - Department of Economics

Date Written: January 5, 2007

Abstract

This paper identifies the pertinent institutions governing the structure of payoffs with regard to female career progression. Drawing on recent insights in behavioral economics, we hypothesize that interactions between psychological mechanisms and the institutional setup may be important determinants of cross-country differences in the level and evolution of female representation on executive positions in the business sector. We test this proposition informally by exploring whether it can be used to account for some of the observed differences between Sweden and the US in this respect. Our normative conclusion is that institutional reforms aimed at increasing female representation should take into account the role of psychological mechanisms in determining career choices and how these mechanisms are affected by relevant institutions such as the level of personal taxes, rules for parental leave, child care and wage-setting arrangements. Throughout the strong path dependence in career choice and career progression is emphasized.

Keywords: Career choice; Career incentives, Gender equality, Parental leave, Household production

JEL Classification: D13, D63, J16, J20, M52

Suggested Citation

Henrekson, Magnus and Dreber, Anna, Female Career Success: Institutions, Path Dependence and Psychology (January 5, 2007). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=996873 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.996873

Magnus Henrekson (Contact Author)

Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN) ( email )

P.O. Box 55665
Grevgatan 34
Stockholm, SE-10215
Sweden
+46-8-6654502 (Phone)
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HOME PAGE: http://www.ifn.se/mh

Anna Dreber

Stockholm School of Economics - Department of Economics ( email )

P.O. Box 6501
Sveavagen 65
S-113 83 Stockholm
Sweden

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