Euro-Area Banking at the Crossroads

75 Pages Posted: 29 Jan 2006

See all articles by Agnes Belaisch

Agnes Belaisch

International Monetary Fund-Paris Office

Laura E. Kodres

International Monetary Fund (IMF) - Research Department

Joaquim Levy

Ministry of Finance, Brazil (on leave)

Angel J. Ubide

Tudor Investment Corporation

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: March 2001

Abstract

This paper analyses the process of disintermediation, the progress in consolidation, the impact of new technologies, and the role of ownership and control structures for the euro area banking sector. The impact of these trends on competition policy, too big to fail concerns, and financial stability is investigated. In this setting, the paper endorses stronger cross-border coordination among supervisory authorities but notes that more formal cross-border arrangements through supranational agencies seem, at this stage, premature. However, an increased capacity to perform centralized market surveillance, building on domestic supervisory information, is needed to ensure the efficiency and stability of euro-area financial markets.

Keywords: Banking mergers, too big too fail, banking supervision

JEL Classification: G21, G28, G34

Suggested Citation

Belaisch, Agnes and Kodres, Laura E. and Levy, Joaquim and Ubide-Querol, Angel J., Euro-Area Banking at the Crossroads (March 2001). IMF Working Paper No. 01/28, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=879383

Agnes Belaisch (Contact Author)

International Monetary Fund-Paris Office ( email )

700 19th Street NW
Washington, DC 20431
United States

Laura E. Kodres

International Monetary Fund (IMF) - Research Department ( email )

700 19th Street NW
Washington, DC 20431
United States
202-623-6161 (Phone)
202-623-6339 (Fax)

Joaquim Levy

Ministry of Finance, Brazil (on leave) ( email )

Rio de Janeiro
Brazil

Angel J. Ubide-Querol

Tudor Investment Corporation ( email )

800 Connecticut Avenue, Suite 810
Washington, DC 20006
United States
1-202-833 4100 (Phone)
1-202-833 4104 (Fax)

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