Equity Borrowing Constraints and the Informed Trading Strategies of Short Sellers

39 Pages Posted: 23 Dec 2022

See all articles by Benjamin M. Blau

Benjamin M. Blau

Utah State University - Huntsman School of Business

Joshua Della Vedova

The University of San Diego - Knauss School of Business

Corbin Fox

James Madison University- Department of Finance

Jason M. Smith

Utah State University

Abstract

Informed investors have been shown to break up their larger trades into smaller trades in order to disguise their information. This study considers informed trading strategies when investors face borrowing constraints. Borrowing constraints may induce more intense trading and increase the use of unusually large trade sizes. Using data consisting of short sales, we test this assertion empirically. Following prior work that documents that short sales contain information about future stock prices, we show that the most informed (return predictive) short sales are driven primarily by large short sales in stocks with higher equity borrowing constraints.

Keywords: Short selling, borrowing constraints, trading

Suggested Citation

Blau, Benjamin M. and Della Vedova, Joshua and Fox, Corbin and Smith, Jason M., Equity Borrowing Constraints and the Informed Trading Strategies of Short Sellers. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4310583 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4310583

Benjamin M. Blau

Utah State University - Huntsman School of Business ( email )

3500 Old Main Hill
Logan, UT 84322
United States

Joshua Della Vedova

The University of San Diego - Knauss School of Business ( email )

5998 Alcala Park
San Diego, CA 92110-2492
United States

Corbin Fox

James Madison University- Department of Finance ( email )

Zane Showker Hall
Harrisburg, VA 22801
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.corbinfox.com

Jason M. Smith (Contact Author)

Utah State University ( email )

Logan, UT 84322
United States

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