Does Random Selection of Commissioners Improve the Quality of Selected Candidates? An Investigation in the Italian Academia

33 Pages Posted: 10 Jul 2017

See all articles by Daniele Checchi

Daniele Checchi

Università degli Studi di Milano - Dipartimento di Economia Politica e Aziendale (DEPA); IZA Institute of Labor Economics; IRVAPP

Silvia De Poli

FBK-IRVAPP

Enrico Rettore

University of Padua; IRVAPP

Abstract

We study a reform occurred in Italy in 2008 in the formation of selection committees for qualifying as university professor. Prior to the reform members of the selection committees were elected by their peers, after the reform they have been randomly drawn. This policy was intended to increase the equality of opportunities of candidates via a reduction of the role played by connections to commissioners. Results show that the reform was ineffective in reducing the probability contribution of being an insider, but attenuated the impact of being connected to a commissioner without significantly raising the impact of scientific quality of candidates on the outcome of competitions. We also find that candidates internalised the changed environment and adapted their strategy of application.

Keywords: university recruitment, incentives, negotiation, formal procedures

JEL Classification: M51, I23, D82, J45

Suggested Citation

Checchi, Daniele and De Poli, Silvia and Rettore, Enrico, Does Random Selection of Commissioners Improve the Quality of Selected Candidates? An Investigation in the Italian Academia. IZA Discussion Paper No. 10844, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2998953 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2998953

Daniele Checchi (Contact Author)

Università degli Studi di Milano - Dipartimento di Economia Politica e Aziendale (DEPA) ( email )

Milan, 20122
Italy
+39 02 5032 1519 (Phone)
+39 02 5032 1505 (Fax)

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

IRVAPP ( email )

Via Santa Croce 77
Trento, I-38122
Italy

Silvia De Poli

FBK-IRVAPP

via Santa Croce 77
Trento, 38122
Italy

Enrico Rettore

University of Padua ( email )

Via Verdi 26
Trento, 28122
Italy
+39 0461 281316 (Phone)

IRVAPP ( email )

Via Santa Croce 77
Trento, I-38122
Italy

Do you have negative results from your research you’d like to share?

Paper statistics

Downloads
36
Abstract Views
427
PlumX Metrics