Racial Differences in Inequality Aversion: Evidence from Real World Respondents in the Ultimatum Game

63 Pages Posted: 21 Mar 2011

See all articles by John D. Griffin

John D. Griffin

University of Notre Dame - Department of Political Science

David Nickerson

University of Notre Dame

Abigail Wozniak

Federal Reserve Banks - Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis; IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Abstract

The distinct historical and cultural experiences of American blacks and whites may influence whether members of those groups perceive a particular exchange as fair. We investigate racial differences in fairness standards using preferences for equal treatment in the ultimatum game, where responders choose to allow a proposed division of a monetary amount or to block it. Although previous research has studied group differences in the ultimatum game, no study has been able to examine these across races in America. We use a sample of over 1600 blacks and whites drawn from the universe of registered voters in three states and merged with information on neighborhood income and racial composition. We experimentally vary proposed divisions as well as the implied race of the ultimatum game proposer. We find no overall racial differences in acceptance rates or aversion to inequality. However, we uncover racial differences in ultimatum game behavior on other dimensions. Many of these are driven by the lowest income group in our sample, which represents the 10th percentile of the black income distribution. We also find that blacks are more sensitive to unfair proposals from other blacks.

Keywords: racial differences, inequality aversion, ultimatum game, artefactual experiments

JEL Classification: J15, D03, D63, C72, C91

Suggested Citation

Griffin, John D. and Nickerson, David and Wozniak, Abigail, Racial Differences in Inequality Aversion: Evidence from Real World Respondents in the Ultimatum Game. IZA Discussion Paper No. 5569, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1790680 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1790680

John D. Griffin

University of Notre Dame - Department of Political Science ( email )

217 O'Shaughnessy Hall
Notre Dame, IN 46556
United States

David Nickerson (Contact Author)

University of Notre Dame ( email )

361 Mendoza College of Business
Notre Dame, IN 46556-5646
United States

Abigail Wozniak

Federal Reserve Banks - Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis ( email )

90 Hennepin Avenue
Minneapolis, MN 55480
United States

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

Do you have negative results from your research you’d like to share?

Paper statistics

Downloads
46
Abstract Views
657
PlumX Metrics