Optimal Taxation When Consumers Have Endogenous Benchmark Levels of Consumption

67 Pages Posted: 17 Nov 2003 Last revised: 7 Aug 2022

See all articles by Andrew B. Abel

Andrew B. Abel

University of Pennsylvania - Finance Department; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Date Written: November 2003

Abstract

I examine optimal taxes in an overlapping generations economy in which each consumer's utility depends on consumption relative to a weighted average of consumption by others (the benchmark level of consumption) as well as on the level of the consumer's own consumption. The socially optimal balanced growth path is characterized by the Modified Golden Rule and by a condition on the intergenerational allocation of consumption in each period. A competitive economy can be induced to attain the social optimum by a lump-sum pay-as-you-go social security system and a tax on capital income.

Suggested Citation

Abel, Andrew B., Optimal Taxation When Consumers Have Endogenous Benchmark Levels of Consumption (November 2003). NBER Working Paper No. w10099, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=468786

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