Pricing Capital Under Mandatory Unbundling and Facilities Sharing

31 Pages Posted: 4 May 2005 Last revised: 4 Sep 2022

See all articles by Robert S. Pindyck

Robert S. Pindyck

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Date Written: March 2005

Abstract

The regulation of telecommunications, railroads, and other network industries has been based on mandatory unbundling and facilities sharing - entrants have the option to lease part or all of incumbents' facilities if and when they desire, at rates determined by regulators. This flexibility is of great value to entrants, but because investments are largely irreversible, it is costly to supply by incumbents. However, pricing formulas used by regulators to set lease rates for capital do not compensate incumbents for this flexibility, so that incumbents are effectively forced to subsidized entrants, discouraging further investments. This paper shows how pricing formulas used to set lease rates can be adjusted to account for the transfer of option value from incumbents to entrants, and estimates the average size of the adjustment for land-based local voice telecommunications in the U.S.

Suggested Citation

Pindyck, Robert S., Pricing Capital Under Mandatory Unbundling and Facilities Sharing (March 2005). NBER Working Paper No. w11225, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=693086

Robert S. Pindyck (Contact Author)

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management ( email )

100 Main Street
Cambridge, MA 02139
United States
617-253-6641 (Phone)
617-258-6855 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://web.mit.edu/rpindyck/www/

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.nber.org