Do Target CEOS Sell Out Their Shareholders to Keep Their Job in a Merger?

32 Pages Posted: 17 Feb 2009 Last revised: 27 Mar 2022

See all articles by Leonce Bargeron

Leonce Bargeron

University of Kentucky - Gatton College of Business and Economics

Frederik P. Schlingemann

University of Pittsburgh - Finance Group; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

René M. Stulz

Ohio State University (OSU) - Department of Finance; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Chad J. Zutter

University of Pittsburgh

Date Written: February 2009

Abstract

CEOs have a potential conflict of interest when their company is acquired: they can bargain to be retained by the acquirer and for private benefits rather than for a higher premium to be paid to the shareholders. We investigate the determinants of target CEO retention by the acquirer and whether target CEO retention affects the premium paid by the acquirer. The probability that a CEO is retained increases with a private bidder, the performance of the target, and with the fraction of target shares held by insiders. Regardless of the bidder type, we find no evidence that the premium paid is lower when the CEO is retained by the acquirer. Strikingly, the target stock price increases more at the announcement of an acquisition by a private firm when the CEO is retained than when she is not. This result holds whether the private acquirer is a private equity firm or an operating company and for management buyouts.

Suggested Citation

Bargeron, Leonce and Schlingemann, Frederik Paul and Stulz, Rene M. and Zutter, Chad J., Do Target CEOS Sell Out Their Shareholders to Keep Their Job in a Merger? (February 2009). NBER Working Paper No. w14724, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1344704

Leonce Bargeron

University of Kentucky - Gatton College of Business and Economics ( email )

550 South Limestone
Lexington, KY 40506
United States
859-257-4397 (Phone)

Frederik Paul Schlingemann

University of Pittsburgh - Finance Group ( email )

368A Mervis Hall
Pittsburgh, PA 15260
United States
(412) 648 1847 (Phone)
(412) 648 1693 (Fax)

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

Rene M. Stulz (Contact Author)

Ohio State University (OSU) - Department of Finance ( email )

2100 Neil Avenue
Columbus, OH 43210-1144
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.cob.ohio-state.edu/fin/faculty/stulz

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

Chad J. Zutter

University of Pittsburgh ( email )

352 Mervis Hall, Katz GSOB
University of Pittsburgh
Pittsburgh, PA 15260
United States
412-648-2159 (Phone)
412-648-1693 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.pitt.edu/~czutter/

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