Take the Short Route: Equilibrium Default and Debt Maturity

45 Pages Posted: 21 Nov 2016 Last revised: 5 Jun 2023

See all articles by Mark Aguiar

Mark Aguiar

Princeton University

Manuel Amador

Federal Reserve Banks - Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis

Hugo A. Hopenhayn

University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) - Department of Economics

Iván Werning

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Date Written: November 2016

Abstract

We study the interactions between sovereign debt default and maturity choice in a setting with limited commitment for repayment as well as future debt issuances. Our main finding is that under a wide range of conditions the sovereign should, as long as default is not preferable, remain passive in long-term bond markets, making payments and retiring long-term bonds as they mature but never actively issuing or buying back such bonds. The only active debt-management margin is the short-term bond market. We show that any attempt to manipulate the existing maturity profile of outstanding long-term bonds generates losses, as bond prices move against the sovereign. Our results hold regardless of the shape of the yield curve. The yield curve captures the average costs of financing at different maturities but is misleading regarding the marginal costs.

Suggested Citation

Aguiar, Mark and Amador, Manuel and Hopenhayn, Hugo A. and Werning, Ivan, Take the Short Route: Equilibrium Default and Debt Maturity (November 2016). NBER Working Paper No. w22847, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2873320

Mark Aguiar (Contact Author)

Princeton University ( email )

Princeton, NJ 08544-1021
United States

Manuel Amador

Federal Reserve Banks - Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis ( email )

90 Hennepin Avenue
Minneapolis, MN 55480
United States

Hugo A. Hopenhayn

University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) - Department of Economics ( email )

Box 951477
Los Angeles, CA 90095-1477
United States

Ivan Werning

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Department of Economics ( email )

50 Memorial Drive
Room E52-251
Cambridge, MA 02142
United States
617-452-3662 (Phone)
617-253-1330 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://econ-www.mit.edu/faculty/iwerning

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

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