Deduction Dilemmas: The Taiwan Assignment Mechanism

25 Pages Posted: 17 Sep 2018 Last revised: 18 May 2023

See all articles by Umut Dur

Umut Dur

North Carolina State University

Parag A. Pathak

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Department of Economics

Fei Song

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics

Tayfun Sönmez

Boston College

Date Written: September 2018

Abstract

This paper analyzes the properties of the Taiwan mechanism, used for high school placement nationwide starting in 2014. In the Taiwan mechanism, points are deducted from an applicant's score with larger penalties for lower ranked choices. Deduction makes the mechanism a new hybrid between the well-known Boston and deferred acceptance mechanisms. Our analysis sheds light on why Taiwan's new mechanism has led to massive nationwide demonstrations and why it nonetheless still remains in use.

Suggested Citation

Dur, Umut and Pathak, Parag A. and Song, Fei and Sönmez, Tayfun, Deduction Dilemmas: The Taiwan Assignment Mechanism (September 2018). NBER Working Paper No. w25024, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3250541

Umut Dur (Contact Author)

North Carolina State University ( email )

Hillsborough Street
Raleigh, NC 27695
United States

Parag A. Pathak

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Department of Economics ( email )

50 Memorial Drive
E52-391
Cambridge, MA 02142
United States

Fei Song

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics ( email )

77 Massachusetts Avenue
50 Memorial Drive
Cambridge, MA 02139-4307
United States

Tayfun Sönmez

Boston College

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