Storable Votes and Quadratic Voting. An Experiment on Four California Propositions

41 Pages Posted: 4 Feb 2019 Last revised: 16 Mar 2023

See all articles by Alessandra Casella

Alessandra Casella

Columbia University - Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, Department of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Luis Sanchez

Cornell University - Department of Economics; Columbia University

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: January 2019

Abstract

Storable Votes and Quadratic Voting are voting systems designed to account for voters’ intensity of preferences. We test their performance in two samples of California residents using data on four initiatives prepared for the 2016 California ballot. We bootstrap the original samples and generate two sets of 10,000 multi-elections simulations. As per design, both systems induce minority victories and result in higher expected welfare relative to majority voting. In our parametrization, quadratic voting induces more minority victories and achieves higher average welfare, but causes more frequent inefficient minority victories. The results are robust to different plausible rules-of-thumb in casting votes.

Suggested Citation

Casella, Alessandra and Sanchez, Luis, Storable Votes and Quadratic Voting. An Experiment on Four California Propositions (January 2019). NBER Working Paper No. w25510, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3328377

Alessandra Casella (Contact Author)

Columbia University - Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, Department of Economics ( email )

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National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

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Luis Sanchez

Cornell University - Department of Economics ( email )

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Columbia University ( email )

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