Nudging Timely Wage Reporting: Field Experimental Evidence from the United States Social Supplementary Income Program

37 Pages Posted: 28 Sep 2020 Last revised: 2 Mar 2023

See all articles by Christina Yiwei Zhang

Christina Yiwei Zhang

University of Wisconsin - Madison

Jeffrey Hemmeter

Government of the United States of America - Social Security Administration

Judd B. Kessler

University of Pennsylvania - Business & Public Policy Department

Robert D. Metcalfe

Boston University

Robert Weathers

Syracuse University - Center for Policy Research

Date Written: September 2020

Abstract

We study a large-scale (n=50,000) natural field experiment implemented by the U.S. Social Security Administration that was aimed at increasing the timely and accurate self-reporting of wages by Supplemental Security Income (SSI) recipients. Sending a letter reminding SSI recipients of their wage reporting responsibilities significantly increased both the likelihood of reporting any earnings and the total amount of earnings reported, though this effect decays slightly over time. However, the specific letter content—providing social information or highlighting the salience of penalties—had no systematic effect. We develop a conservative estimate that the letters generated roughly $5.91 in savings on average per dollar spent for the U.S. government.

Suggested Citation

Zhang, Christina Yiwei and Hemmeter, Jeffrey and Kessler, Judd B. and Metcalfe, Robert D. and Weathers, Robert, Nudging Timely Wage Reporting: Field Experimental Evidence from the United States Social Supplementary Income Program (September 2020). NBER Working Paper No. w27875, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3700702

Christina Yiwei Zhang (Contact Author)

University of Wisconsin - Madison

Jeffrey Hemmeter

Government of the United States of America - Social Security Administration ( email )

Washington, DC
United States

Judd B. Kessler

University of Pennsylvania - Business & Public Policy Department ( email )

3641 Locust Walk
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6372
United States

HOME PAGE: http://https://bepp.wharton.upenn.edu/profile/1671/

Robert D. Metcalfe

Boston University ( email )

595 Commonwealth Avenue
Boston, MA 02215
United States

Robert Weathers

Syracuse University - Center for Policy Research ( email )

Department of Economics
Syracuse, NY 13244
United States
315-443-3114 (Phone)

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