Stronger Protection or Technological Revolution: What is Behind the Recent Surge in Patenting?

75 Pages Posted: 1 Jul 2000 Last revised: 16 Dec 2022

See all articles by Samuel S. Kortum

Samuel S. Kortum

University of Chicago - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Josh Lerner

Harvard Business School - Finance Unit; Harvard University - Entrepreneurial Management Unit; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI); Harvard University - Private Capital Research Institute

Date Written: September 1997

Abstract

We investigate the cause of an unprecedented surge of U.S. patenting over the past" decade. Conventional wisdom points to the establishment of the Court of Appeals of the" Federal Circuit by Congress in 1982. We examine whether this institutional change benefitted patent holders, explains the burst in U.S. patenting. Using both international and" domestic data on patent applications and awards, we conclude that the evidence is not favorable" to the conventional view. Instead, it appears that the jump in patenting reflects an increase in" U.S. innovation spurred by changes in the management of research.

Suggested Citation

Kortum, Samuel S. and Lerner, Josh, Stronger Protection or Technological Revolution: What is Behind the Recent Surge in Patenting? (September 1997). NBER Working Paper No. w6204, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=225962

Samuel S. Kortum (Contact Author)

University of Chicago - Department of Economics ( email )

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National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

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Josh Lerner

Harvard Business School - Finance Unit ( email )

Boston, MA 02163
United States
617-495-6065 (Phone)
617-496-7357 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.people.hbs.edu/jlerner/

Harvard University - Entrepreneurial Management Unit

Cambridge, MA 02163
United States

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

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1000 Brussels
Belgium

Harvard University - Private Capital Research Institute ( email )

114 Western Ave
Allston, MA 02134
United States

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