Individual Rights and Collective Agents: The Role of Old and New Workplace Institutions in the Regulation of Labor Markets

48 Pages Posted: 15 Mar 2003 Last revised: 20 Feb 2022

See all articles by David Weil

David Weil

Brandeis University - The Heller School for Social Policy and Management; Harvard Kennedy School Ash Institute for Democracy

Date Written: March 2003

Abstract

Implementation of workplace policies--whether through enforcement of laws or administration of programs--raises the question of the interaction between institutions created to carry out laws and the activities of workplace based agents that directly (e.g. unions) or indirectly (e.g. insurance companies) represent the interests of workers. This paper argues that there are two distinctive roles required for agents in the implementation of workplace policies. First, the agent must somehow help solve the public goods problem inherent in workplace regulation. Second, the agent must be able to reduce the marginal cost of exercising rights conferred to workers that are an important feature of most regulatory programs. This article examines these issues in regard to implementing workplace policies in the U.S. and analyzes the comparative effectiveness of different workplace agents- from labor unions to alternative dispute resolution systems- in fulfilling these roles.

Suggested Citation

Weil, David, Individual Rights and Collective Agents: The Role of Old and New Workplace Institutions in the Regulation of Labor Markets (March 2003). NBER Working Paper No. w9565, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=387572

David Weil (Contact Author)

Brandeis University - The Heller School for Social Policy and Management ( email )

P.O. Box 549110/MS 035
415 South Street
Waltham, MA 02454
United States

Harvard Kennedy School Ash Institute for Democracy ( email )

79 John F. Kennedy Street
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Do you have negative results from your research you’d like to share?

Paper statistics

Downloads
58
Abstract Views
1,673
Rank
653,722
PlumX Metrics