Active Courts and Menu Contracts
26 Pages Posted: 16 Jul 2008
There are 2 versions of this paper
Active Courts and Menu Contracts
Date Written: October 2006
Abstract
We describe and analyze a contractual environment that allows a role for an active court. The model we analyze is the same as in Anderlini, Felli, and Postlewaite (2006). An active court can improve on the outcome that the parties would achieve without it. The institutional role of the court is to maximize the parties' welfare under a veil of ignorance. In Anderlini, Felli, and Postlewaite (2006) the possibility of "menu contracts" between the informed buyer and the uninformed seller is described but not analyzed. Here, we fully analyze this case. We find that if we maintain the assumption that one of the potential objects of trade is not contractible ex-ante, the results of Anderlini, Felli, and Postlewaite (2006) survive intact. If however we let all "widgets" be contractible ex-ante, then multiple equilibria obtain. In this case the role for an active court is to ensure the inefficient pooling equilibria do not exist alongside the superior ones in which separation occurs.
JEL Classification: C79, D74, D89, K40, L14
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
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