Simple, Implementable Fiscal Policy Rules

43 Pages Posted: 28 Apr 2009

See all articles by Michael Kumhof

Michael Kumhof

CEPR

Douglas Laxton

International Monetary Fund (IMF) - Research Department

Date Written: April 2009

Abstract

This paper analyzes the scope for systematic rules-based fiscal activism in open economies. Relative to a balanced budget rule, automatic stabilizers significantly improve welfare. But they minimize fiscal instrument volatility rather than business cycle volatility. A more aggressively countercyclical tax revenue gap rule increases welfare gains by around 50 percent, with only modest increases in fiscal instrument volatility. For raw materials revenue gaps the government should let automatic stabilizers work. The best fiscal instruments are targeted transfers, consumption taxes and labor taxes, or, if it enters private utility, government spending. The welfare gains are significantly lower for more open economies.

Keywords: Fiscal policy, Business cycles, Revenues, Monetary policy, External shocks, Commodity prices, Copper, Manufacturing, Economic stabilization, Economic models

Suggested Citation

Kumhof, Michael and Laxton, Douglas, Simple, Implementable Fiscal Policy Rules (April 2009). IMF Working Paper No. 09/76, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1394776

Michael Kumhof (Contact Author)

CEPR ( email )

London
United Kingdom

Douglas Laxton

International Monetary Fund (IMF) - Research Department ( email )

700 19th Street NW
Washington, DC 20431
United States