Pharmaceutical Patents and Prices: A Preliminary Empirical Assessment Using Data from India

21 Pages Posted: 20 Apr 2016

See all articles by Mark Duggan

Mark Duggan

University of Pennsylvania - Business & Public Policy Department

Aparajita Goyal

World Bank

Date Written: May 1, 2012

Abstract

The enforcement of stringent intellectual property rights in the pharmaceutical sector of developing countries generates considerable controversy, due to both the extensive research investment and the public policy importance of this sector. This paper explores the likely effects of enforcing product patents on prices and utilization of drugs in the Central Nervous System market in India. The Central Nervous System segment is the second largest therapeutic category in terms of retail sales in the world and is one of the fastest growing segments in India. Using information on product patents granted by the government and panel data on pharmaceutical prices and utilization from 2003-2008, the paper finds limited evidence of overall price increase following the introduction of product patents. However, there appear to be heterogeneous effects on prices by the type of product patent granted on drugs, implying the need for a careful examination of the product patent portfolio.

Keywords: Markets and Market Access, Pharmaceuticals & Pharmacoeconomics, Real & Intellectual Property Law, E-Business, Access to Markets

Suggested Citation

Duggan, Mark and Goyal, Aparajita, Pharmaceutical Patents and Prices: A Preliminary Empirical Assessment Using Data from India (May 1, 2012). World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 6063, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2054361

Mark Duggan

University of Pennsylvania - Business & Public Policy Department ( email )

3641 Locust Walk
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6372
United States

Aparajita Goyal

World Bank ( email )

1818 H Street, NW
Washington, DC 20433
United States

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
211
Abstract Views
1,006
rank
171,571
PlumX Metrics