Download this Paper Open PDF in Browser

Financial Fair Play ou "Oligopoleague" de clubs rentiers: Elements d'analyse en droit de la concurrence ('Financial Fair Play' or Rent-Seeking 'Oligopoleague'?: A Preliminary Analysis of the UEFA's Break Even Requirement Under the EU Competition Rules)

5 Pages Posted: 21 May 2014  

Nicolas Petit

University of Liege - School of Law; International Center for Law & Economics (ICLE); University of South Australia - School of Law

Date Written: May 18, 2014

Abstract

French Abstract: Cet article propose une analyse préliminaire du système d'équilibre financier de l'UEFA sous l'angle des règles européennes de concurrence. Il argue que le Règlement instaurant cette règle comporte un risque sérieux d'infraction à l'article 101 TFUE dans la mesure où il consacre une limitation concertée des investissements au regard de l'article 101(1) b) TFUE et que le cas échéant, la structure du marché risque d'être fossilisée au bénéfice d'un oligopole étroit de clubs de football.

English Abstract: This short paper offers a first analysis of the UEFA's "break even requirement" under the EU competition rules. It shows that there are good reasons to believe that the UEFA Financial Fair Play regulation violates Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU, in particular because it limits investments in the sense of Article 101(1) b) TFEU and in turn risks ossifying the market structure to the benefit of a tight oligopoly of football clubs.

Notes: Downloadable document is in French.

Keywords: financial fair play; competition law; cartel; article 101; investment; self regulation

JEL Classification: K21; L4; L44

Suggested Citation

Petit, Nicolas, Financial Fair Play ou "Oligopoleague" de clubs rentiers: Elements d'analyse en droit de la concurrence ('Financial Fair Play' or Rent-Seeking 'Oligopoleague'?: A Preliminary Analysis of the UEFA's Break Even Requirement Under the EU Competition Rules) (May 18, 2014). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2438399 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2438399

Nicolas Petit (Contact Author)

University of Liege - School of Law ( email )

B-4000 Liege
Belgium

International Center for Law & Economics (ICLE) ( email )

United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.laweconcenter.org/contact.html

University of South Australia - School of Law ( email )

GPO Box 2471
Adelaide SA 5001
Australia

Paper statistics

Downloads
295
Rank
85,243
Abstract Views
1,254