Elevating Substance Over Procedure: The Retroactivity of Miller v. Alabama Under Teague v. Lane

The City University of New York Law Review, Vol. 18.1, 2015, Forthcoming

31 Pages Posted: 14 Oct 2014

Date Written: September 6, 2014

Abstract

This Article proposes a framework establishing that the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Miller v. Alabama, which forbids states from automatically sentencing juveniles to life imprisonment without any meaningful opportunity for release, must apply retroactively to hundreds of juveniles whose convictions and life sentences were already final at the time of the decision. Such a framework is timely and critical. Although the lower state and federal courts are almost evenly divided on the question, the Supreme Court has yet to settle the divide.

The Article reviews how, absent guidance from the Supreme Court, a host of states, led recently by Michigan, have invoked the Miller majority’s statement that it was merely requiring states to follow a "certain process" before sentencing a juvenile to life imprisonment without parole. By this reasoning, Miller is not retroactive under the Supreme Court’s federal retroactivity doctrine established by Teague v. Lane. The Court has always applied new substantive rules retroactively under Teague, while it has never done so for a new procedural rule.

The Article rejects this "process" language as a basis for resolving whether Miller is retroactivity. It concludes that Miller in fact has little to do with process and is instead primarily concerned with sentencing outcomes for youth. In striking down mandatory life without parole for juveniles, Miller adapted the individualized sentencing requirement from Woodson v. North Carolina, which invalidated the mandatory death penalty. This individualized sentencing requirement obligates states to always offer juveniles a sentencing outcome carrying the possibility of release and to consider the essential, mitigating fact of youth before imposing an irrevocable life sentence. These obligations are inherently substantive. By contrast, Miller’s alleged procedural component is undefined and collateral to its substantive altering of juvenile sentencing. Miller therefore announces a substantive rule that must apply retroactively.

Keywords: Miller v. Alabama, juvenile sentencing, juvenile life without parole, retroactivity, Teague v. Lane

Suggested Citation

Buskey, Brandon and Korobkin, Daniel, Elevating Substance Over Procedure: The Retroactivity of Miller v. Alabama Under Teague v. Lane (September 6, 2014). The City University of New York Law Review, Vol. 18.1, 2015, Forthcoming, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2492485

Brandon Buskey (Contact Author)

ACLU ( email )

125 Broad Street
New York, NY 10004
United States

Daniel Korobkin

ACLU of Michigan ( email )

2966 Woodward Ave.
Detroit, MI 48201
United States

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