The Most Knowledgeable Branch

34 Pages Posted: 14 Jul 2015 Last revised: 1 Nov 2015

See all articles by Cass R. Sunstein

Cass R. Sunstein

Harvard Law School; Harvard University - Harvard Kennedy School (HKS)

Date Written: July 14, 2015

Abstract

In the modern era, the executive branch has extraordinary information-gathering advantages over the legislative and judicial branches. As a result, it will often know immeasurably more than they do, both on domestic issues and on foreign affairs. In general, it also has a strong system of internal checks and balances, reducing (though certainly not eliminating) the risk of factual error. Because the executive is the most knowledgeable branch, it often makes sense, within constitutional boundaries, to give it considerable discretion in both domestic and foreign affairs, and to grant it considerable (though hardly unlimited) deference when it exercises that discretion. Both legislators and judges tend to be insufficiently aware of their epistemic disadvantages. The argument for restricting executive discretion depends on suspicion about the biases and motivations of the most knowledgeable branch and about its failure to give sufficient respect to liberty, and an associated fear of some form of “groupthink,” usually in the form of group polarization. But it is hazardous to invoke that suspicion as a basis for confining the authority of those who know most. These points are illustrated with close reference to the debate over the Department of Transportation’s rear visibility rule, proposed in 2010 and finalized in 2014.

Keywords: separation of powers, executive discretion, cost-benefit analysis, rear visibility

JEL Classification: D02, D73, D78, I18, K23

Suggested Citation

Sunstein, Cass R., The Most Knowledgeable Branch (July 14, 2015). University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Forthcoming. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2630726

Cass R. Sunstein (Contact Author)

Harvard Law School ( email )

1575 Massachusetts Ave
Areeda Hall 225
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
617-496-2291 (Phone)

Harvard University - Harvard Kennedy School (HKS) ( email )

79 John F. Kennedy Street
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Downloads
506
Abstract Views
4,215
rank
53,788
PlumX Metrics